This paper uses the Markov switching approach to account for instabilities in the longrun money demand function and compute the welfare cost of in ‡ation in the United States. In doing so, it circumvents the problem of data-mining of some earlier seminal contributions on these issues, allowing for complicated nonlinear dynamics and sudden changes in the parameters of the money demand function. Moreover, it extends the sample period, and investigates the robustness of results to alternative money demand speci…cations, monetary aggregation procedures, and assumptions regarding dynamics aspects of the money demand speci…cation.
Introduction
Almost all advanced economies are now targeting the in ‡ation rate and have given their central banks greater independence. Moreover, following the success of in ‡ation targeting in advanced economies, a large number of emerging and developing economies have recently switched from exchange rate targeting to in ‡ation targeting. Currently, there are 66 advanced, emerging, and developing economies that target the in ‡ation rate, and many other countries are moving toward this monetary policy framework. Although in ‡ation has been greatly reduced in most countries around the world, in the aftermath of the global …nancial crisis, the zero-lower-bound constraint on policy interest rates led to suggestions by prominent economists to raise the current in ‡ation target to above 2%. This has led to renewed interest on whether in ‡ation is costly, especially given the prevalence of in ‡ation in the economic history of many countries.
Background. Lucas (2000) provides estimates of the welfare cost of in ‡ation using annual data for the United States, over the period from 1900 to 1994, and Bailey's (1956) consumer surplus approach as well as the compensating variation approach. Lucas (2000) uses the log-log money demand speci…cation, inspired by Meltzer (1963) , de…nes the money supply as simple-sum M1, assumes an interest elasticity of 0:5, and reports a welfare cost of in ‡ation of about 1% of real income per year if the annual in ‡ation rate is 10%. Serletis and Yavari (2004) take issue with Lucas's (2000) assumption that the interest elasticity is 0:5. They use the same data and same double log money demand function used by Lucas (2000), but pay particular attention to the time series properties of the money demand variables. Using the long-horizon regression approach developed by Fisher and Seater (1993) , they estimate the interest elasticity of money demand to be 0:21, which is much lower than the 0:5 value assumed by Lucas (2000) , and report a welfare cost of in ‡ation which is about half of the value reported by Lucas (2000) under his assumption that the interest elasticity is 0:5. More recently, Ireland (2009) argues that the semi-log money demand speci…cation, adapted from Cagan (1956) , provides a better …t to the quarterly US data over the post-1980 period. Using the simple-sum M1 monetary aggregate and quarterly data from 1980:q1 to 2006:q4, Ireland (2009) estimates the welfare cost of in ‡ation to be around 0:23% of real income per year (if the annual in ‡ation rate is 10%), which is signi…cantly lower than Lucas's (2000) estimate.
The instability of money demand is crucial to estimating the sensitivity to interest rates and calls into question whether the empirical analyses by Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009) are adequate in estimating the welfare cost of in ‡ation. As Goldfeld and Sichel (1990, p . 300) put it, "the evidence that emerged, at least prior to the mid-1970s, suggested that a few variables (essentially income and interest rates, with appropriate allowance for lags) were capable of providing a plausible and stable explanation of money demand." However, after 1973, conventional money demand functions exhibited substantial instability, with money demand equations that had been successfully …tted to pre-1974 US data, always signi…cantly overpredicting actual money balances in the post-1974 period, which is what Goldfeld (1976) called the "missing money"episode. In trying to explain what happened, economists pointed to the rapid pace of …nancial innovation, which changed the liquid assets that could be used as money, and to regulatory changes, in addition to revisiting empirical issues concerned with the speci…cation of the money demand function and the choice of the dependent and independent variables. A vast literature devoted to these issues -see, for example, Judd and Scadding (1992) , and more recently Lucas and Nicolini (2015) and Benati et al. (2017) -reveals that the instability of the money demand function has not yet been successfully explained.
In his implementation of the welfare cost analysis for the United States, Ireland (2009) plots in Figure 1 (reproduced here using his annual data) the money-income ratio against the nominal interest rate for the United States, over the period from 1990 to 1994, and the …tted money demand curves with coe¢ cients used by Lucas (2000) . He shows that the log-log money demand curve provides a better …t to those low interest rate observations whose money-income ratios are greater than 0:4 than the semi-log speci…cation. However, after extending Lucas's (2000) annual data from 1900-1994 to 1900-2006, and plotting the money-income ratio against the nominal interest rate and the …tted money demand curves from Lucas (2000) in Figure 2 (again reproduced here using his annual data), he makes a distinction between the pre-and post-1980 samples of data, by simple visual inspection, and argues that Lucas's (2000) log-log and semi-log money demand functions do not …t the post-1980 sample of annual data, especially the observations with low interest rates. Those observations form a nearly linear money demand curve which is less interest elastic. Ireland (2009) then estimates the money demand function using quarterly data from 1980 to 2006 and con…rms the breakdown of Lucas's (2000) preferred log-log speci…cation in the post-1980 sample of quarterly data. Ireland (2009) shows that the semi-log speci…cation performs better in the post-1980 sample of quarterly data than the log-log speci…cation, and that the estimated welfare cost of in ‡ation is less than one quarter of Lucas's (2000) estimate.
Contribution. We are motivated by Mogliani and Urga (2018) who employ cointegration analysis, accounting for instabilities in the long-run money demand function, in measuring the welfare cost of in ‡ation in the United States. By using annual data, over the period from 1900 to 2013, Mogliani and Urga (2018) …nd structural breaks in 1945 and 1976 and estimate a substantially lower welfare cost of in ‡ation after 1976. In this paper, we also take issue with the assumption of an exogenous structural break in Ireland (2009) , and use the Markov switching approach, associated with Hamilton (1989) , treating the structural break as endogenous. In doing so, we circumvent the problem of data-mining, and allow for complicated nonlinear dynamics and sudden changes in the parameters of the money demand function. We also extend the sample period and use quarterly data from 1967:q1 to 2013:q4. Moreover, as in Cysne (2003) and Cysne and Turchick (2010) , we make a distinction between the simple-sum M1 monetary aggregate, used in Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009) , and the Divisia M1 monetary aggregate, thus taking up Lucas's (2000) suggestion "to replace M1 with an aggregate in which di¤erent monetary assets are given di¤erent weights."The use of the conventional simple-sum M1 aggregate allows us to make comparisons with Lucas (2000), Ireland (2009) , and Mogliani and Urga (2018) , while the use of the Divisia M1 aggregate allows us to investigate the robustness of our results to alternative monetary aggregation procedures.
It is to be noted that although the recent literature highlights the importance of the broad (superlative) Divisia monetary aggregates in monetary policy and business cycle analysis [see, for example, Barnett (2016) , Jadidzadeh and Serletis (2018) , and Dery and Serletis (2019)], in this paper we focus on narrow monetary aggregates, because the measurement of the welfare cost of in ‡ation in the money demand framework requires that households hold non-interest bearing money. In this regard, the use of monetary aggregates (in various forms and especially at broader levels of monetary aggregation) in measuring the welfare cost of in ‡ation is subject to a comment by Prescott (1996, p. 114 ) that (in the case of M1), "the theory has households holding non-interest bearing money, while the monetary aggregate used in the demand for money function is M1. Most of M1 is not non-interest bearing debt held by households. Only a third is currency and half of that is probably held abroad. Another third is demand deposits held by businesses, which often earn interest de facto. Households do not use these demand deposits to economize on shopping time. The …nal third is demand deposits held by households that, at least in recent years, can pay interest."
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y discusses the method for calculating the welfare cost of in ‡ation in the context of the Bailey (1956) approach, which is associated with "consumer surplus" analysis in the literature of public …nance and applied microeconomics. Section 3 introduces Markov regime switching to account for potential instability of the money demand function. In Section 4, we reassess the results reported by Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009) , extend the analysis using quarterly US data, make a comparison between the simple-sum and Divisia M1 monetary aggregates, and investigate the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions regarding dynamics aspects of the money demand speci…cation. In Section 5, we further discuss the issue of stability in the demand for money and o¤er suggestions for potentially productive future research. The …nal section contains concluding remarks regarding the policy implications of measuring the welfare cost of in ‡ation accounting for instability of money demand.
Methodology
A standard method for measuring the welfare cost of in ‡ation, pursued by Lucas (2000), Ireland (2009) , and Mogliani and Urga (2018) among others, has been proposed by Bailey (1956) and is associated with "consumer surplus"analysis in the literature of public …nance and applied microeconomics. In this approach, the welfare cost of in ‡ation is the area under the inverse money demand curve, that is, the consumer surplus that can be gained by reducing the nominal interest rate, i, from a positive level to zero. In particular, if m(i) is the money demand function and (x) its inverse, then the welfare cost of in ‡ation is
where w(i) is the welfare cost of in ‡ation, expressed as a fraction of income. Clearly, the …rst step in the calculation of the welfare cost of in ‡ation is the estimation of a money demand function. In this regard, Lucas (2000) suggests two competing speci…cations. One is linear in the (natural) logarithms of m (the ratio of nominal money balances to nominal income, M=Y ) and i (the short-term nominal interest rate)
and the other speci…cation links the logarithm of m to the level of i
where A > 0 and B > 0 are constants. Equation (2) was inspired by Meltzer (1963) and is known as the the log-log (or double log) speci…cation, whereas equation (3) was adapted from Cagan (1956) and is known as the semi-log speci…cation. The key di¤erence between the two speci…cations is the coe¢ cient of the interest rate term. In equation (2), > 0 measures the absolute value of the interest elasticity of money demand, while > 0 in equation (3) measures the absolute value of the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. Lucas (2000) shows that when the money demand function takes the log-log form the welfare cost of in ‡ation is
and when it takes semi-log form the welfare cost of in ‡ation is
Thus, the welfare cost of in ‡ation, w(i), can be obtained from equations (4) and (5) by using estimated coe¢ cients from equations (2) and (3), respectively.
Markov Switching Money Demand
In this paper we extend the analysis and reassess the evidence regarding the welfare cost of in ‡ation, accounting for potential instabilities in the underlying money demand function. We use the Markov regime switching approach, associated with Hamilton (1989) , allowing for complicated nonlinear dynamics and sudden changes in the parameters of the money demand function. In doing so, we model the demand for money as a function of an unobserved regime-shift variable, S t , governed by a …rst-order two-state Markov process. In particular, we consider the log-log Markov switching money demand model given by
where A St and St are estimated coe¢ cients for regime S t , S 1t = 1 and S 2t = 0 if S t = 1, S 1t = 0 and S 2t = 1 if S t = 2, p ij is the transition probability from regime i at time t 1 to regime j at time t. Similarly, we consider the semi-log Markov switching money demand model given by
where B St and St are estimated coe¢ cients for regime S t . The log-log and semi-log Markov switching money demand models are estimated using the Hamilton …lter predicting the probabilities of the unobserved regime and updating the likelihood at each period. The estimation is performed in Stata 14.
Empirical Evidence

Annual Data
As a …rst step, we use the Markov regime switching model to estimate the money demand function, in both log-log and semi-log form, using the Ireland (2009) annual data over the period from 1900 to 2006. The estimated coe¢ cients are shown in Table 1 ; and they all are statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. In Figures 3 and 4 we plot the regime probabilities for the log-log and semi-log speci…cations, respectively, over the sample period. Clearly, both the log-log and semi-log models show that there is a structural break in 1977, three years earlier than Ireland (2009) assumes. As can be seen in Table 1 , regime 2, which covers the post-1977 sample of data, has a much smaller interest-elasticity and semi-elasticity of money demand (in absolute value) than regime 1, which covers the pre-1977 sample of data. Figures 5 and 6 show that the log-log speci…cation provides a better …t to the pre-1977 sample of data, as the semi-log speci…cation fails to capture the (i; m) pairs at the low interest rate environment where the money-income ratio is greater than 0:4. However, the semi-log speci…cation …ts the (i; m) pairs in the post-1977 sample of data better, as they form a nearly linear curve. In other words, our regime 2 can be treated as Ireland's (2009) regime and our regime 1 as Lucas's (2000) regime. Our …ndings are also partially consistent with Mogliani and Urga (2018), who detect two structural breaks, one in 1945 and another in 1976, for the log-log speci…cation, although using an econometric method di¤erent than ours. However, we detect no structural break in 1945 and the Mogliani and Urga (2018) pre-1977 sample of data is captured by our …rst regime.
Figures 5 and 6 also show that the …tted money demand curves for regime 2 become steeper than the ones for regime 1, and also shift leftward for both the log-log and semi-log speci…cations, indicating a large decline in the welfare cost of in ‡ation after 1977. In Table  2 we report the welfare costs of zero, two percent, and ten percent annual in ‡ation for each money demand speci…cation and regime. As can be seen in Table 2 , at each in ‡ation rate, the welfare cost declines dramatically after 1977. It is to be noted that the welfare cost estimates based on the semi-log speci…cation are very close to those reported by Ireland (2009) with quarterly data, as they are over almost the same sample period.
Quarterly Data
Lucas's (2000) focus is on annual data from 1900 to 1994 and Ireland's (2009) focus is on quarterly data over the post-1980 period. In this paper, we extend the sample period and use quarterly data from 1967:q1 to 2013:q4. In doing so, we also make a distinction between the simple-sum M1 monetary aggregate, used in Lucas (2000) The income variable, Y , is measured by nominal GDP and the nominal interest rate, i, by the three-month Treasury bill rate, both obtained from the FRED database. Figure 7 shows quarterly time series of the nominal interest rate and the Sum M1-income and Divisia M1-income ratios for the United States from 1967:q1 to 2013:q4. The moneyincome ratios have a common downward trend, but start diverging in the late 1970s, with the Sum M1-income ratio always being higher than the Divisia M1-income ratio from 1978 onward; the largest spread between the two ratios is about 5%. In Figure 8 we plot the nominal interest rate and the money-income ratio for Sum M1 in panel (a) and Divisia M1 in panel (b) over the 1967:q1 to 2013:q4 sample period. We also include the estimated log-log money demand curve from Lucas (2000) and the semi-log one from Ireland (2009) . Both …gures show that when the nominal interest rate is close to zero, as in the aftermath of the global …nancial crisis, the money demand curve is nearly ‡at. Notice that in Figure  8 , we divide the whole sample into three parts: 1967-1979 (red crosses), 1980-2007 (blue circles), and 2008-2013 (black triangles). As the nominal interest rate decreases from 15% to zero, most blue circle data points are distributed around a steep, downward-sloping line. However, we can also see some red cross data points located away from this line, which are in the range of a 4% to 10% interest rate. The Lucas (2000) curve …ts the data poorly as most observations locate far away from it. The Ireland (2009) curve is closer to the observations from 1980 onward, but nearly all of them locate to the left of it, meaning that it over-estimates the money demand elasticity.
In general, the estimated log-log and semi-log money demand curves in Figure 8 show that we can hardly rely on a uniform, linear relationship between the money-income ratio and the nominal interest rate to estimate the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Thus, we use the Markov regime switching model to investigate the dynamic relationship between the money-income ratio and the nominal interest rate in di¤erent regimes. Tables 3 and 4 report the log-log and semi-log form money demand function estimation results, respectively, for both the Sum M1 and Divisia M1 monetary aggregates. Figures 9-12 display the regime probabilities for each Markov regime switching money demand model, and Table 5 reports each regime's duration time for all models. In general, models using the Sum M1 aggregate show a signi…cant regime switch in the late 1970s whereas models using the Divisia M1 aggregate show a regime switch in the early 1980s. According to the transition probabilities (reported in Tables 3 and 4), both regimes are persistent (p 11 , p 22 > 0:98 for all models). Thus, we have evidence to believe that money demand experienced a structural change in the late 1970s or early 1980s, depending on the monetary aggregate used. We also note that all models show a second structural break after 2010. However, the duration of this regime is short as the structural break is close to the end of the sample period and contains only about 10 observations. For this reason, we focus on the …rst structural break.
For all models, the second regime's money demand elasticity (or semi-elasticity) is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. However, the …rst regime's money demand elasticity (or semi-elasticity) is not statistically signi…cant for both the log-log and semi-log Sum M1 models at the 5% level. The semi-log Divisia M1 model is the only one whose estimated coe¢ cients are all statistically signi…cant at the 1% level in both regimes. Thus, we can conclude that semi-log form o¤ers a better …t to the data, which is consistent with Ireland's (2009) result and supports the …nding that the semi-log form better describes the relationship between the money-income ratio and the nominal interest rate while the log-log form fails to do so.
The semi-log Divisia M1 model estimates in Table 4 also con…rm our visual inspection from Figure 8(b) . The blue circle data points in Figure 8 (b) concentrate closely to a potential steeper line on the left and are far from those loosely distributed red cross data points on the right, indicating that the semi-elasticity of the former is smaller than of the latter. The semi-log Divisia M1 model shows a signi…cant structural change in 1983. Regime 2 dominates the period from 1983 to 2011 (see Figure 12 (a)) and the corresponding money demand semi-elasticity is 1:578 (with a standard error of 0:1519), while regime 1 dominates the period before 1984 whose semi-elasticity is smaller ( 2:2669 (with a standard error of 0:4203)). As most blue circle data points locate in regime 2, this …nding is consistent with our visual inspection from Figure 8 (b) that the data before and after 1980 indicate di¤erent money demand behavior and that the interest elasticity is lower (in absolute value) after the mid-1980s. In other words, this result con…rms a steep money demand curve and a leftward shift of the money demand curve in the mid-1980s. The shift is even clearer when the sample period is divided according to the estimates of the semi-log Divisia M1 model, choosing 1984:q3 and 2011:q4 as the structural change points, with …tted money demand curves as shown in Figure 13 .
In Table 6 we present estimates of the welfare cost of in ‡ation implied by our regression results, using equations (4) and (5) , regardless of the statistical signi…cance of the estimates. As in the earlier literature, we assume a steady-state real interest rate, r, of 3%, which is also accepted by the US Federal Reserve. Thus, according to the Fisher equation, i = r + , i = 3% corresponds to zero in ‡ation, i = 5% corresponds to 2% in ‡ation (which is the Fed's in ‡ation rate target), and i = 13% corresponds to 10% in ‡ation. We use the log-log and semi-log Markov regime switching models to estimate the welfare cost of zero, two percent, and ten percent in ‡ation in each regime. These estimates can also be used to compute the welfare cost of a positive in ‡ation rate compared to price stability (zero in ‡ation). For example, w(0:13) w(0:03) measures the welfare cost of ten percent annual in ‡ation.
All estimates from the Markov regime switching models using the log-log form are much smaller than those reported by Lucas (2000) . For example, the welfare cost of ten percent in ‡ation in regime 2 with the log-log Sum M1 model is only about 0:09% of income, which is far below Lucas's (2000) 1%. The log-log Divisia M1 model generates an even more trivial welfare cost of in ‡ation. The welfare cost of in ‡ation estimates computed from the semilog Sum M1 Markov regime switching model for regime 2 are very close to Ireland's (2009) estimates. Speci…cally, for ten percent in ‡ation, the welfare cost in regime 2 is about 0:2% while Ireland's (2009) estimate is 0:2192%. This result is not surprising as we employ the same semi-log money demand form as Ireland (2009) , and regime 2 covers almost the same sample period. Although this model does not generate statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient estimates in both regimes, our results again con…rm the robustness of Ireland's (2009) main …nding. Welfare cost estimates from the semi-log Divisia M1 Markov regime switching model are all based on statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient estimates. In regime 2 (1983:q3-2011:q4), the welfare cost of 2% annual in ‡ation compared to zero in ‡ation is about 0:0253% of income. With 10% annual in ‡ation, the welfare cost is 0:1575% of income. The welfare cost in regime 1 (mainly before 1983:q3) is about two times of the cost in regime 2. In general, our estimates of the welfare cost of in ‡ation are signi…cantly smaller than those reported by earlier work, especially for the regime covering the post-1980 sample of data.
Partial Adjustment Model
We have shown that the speci…cation of the money demand function is crucial in the calculation of the welfare cost of in ‡ation. However, as Serletis and Yavari (2004) noted the integration and cointegration properties of the money demand variables are also important in the estimation of the interest elasticity of money demand and the calculation of the welfare cost of in ‡ation. In this regard, Lucas (2000) assumes a stable money demand function and an interest elasticity of 0:5 to calculate the welfare cost of in ‡ation using the double log money demand function. Ireland (2009) shows that the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the nonstationary money demand variables cannot be rejected with the post-1980 sample of quarterly data when the double log speci…cation is used, but can be rejected with the semi-log speci…cation at conventional signi…cance levels. More recently, Mogliani and Urga (2018) , in extending the analysis and reassessing the results reported by Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009) , use the log-log speci…cation and annual data, over the period from 1900 to 2013, and …nd evidence of cointegration between the money-income ratio and the interest rate only when two statistically signi…cant structural breaks (in 1945 and 1976) are accounted for.
We also use integration and cointegration tests to investigate if there exists a stable longrun equilibrium relationship between the money-income ratio and the interest rate, in both log-log and semi-log forms, using our quarterly data from 1967:q1 to 2013:q4. In particular, we conduct a battery of unit root and stationarity tests in the natural logs of the moneyincome ratios (ln m) and the level (i) and natural log (ln i) of the interest rate. We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test [see Dickey and Fuller (1981) ] and the Dickey-Fuller GLS test [see Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) ], assuming both a constant and trend, to determine whether the series have a unit root. The optimal lag length is taken to be the order selected by the Schwarz information criterion (assuming a maximum lag length of 14). Moreover, given that unit root tests have low power against trend stationary alternatives, we also use the KPSS test [see Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) ] to test the null hypothesis of stationarity. Results not reported here (but available upon request) indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at conventional signi…cance levels by both the ADF and DF-GLS test statistics for all the series and di¤erent subsamples of the data. Moreover, the null hypothesis of stationarity can be rejected at conventional signi…cance levels by the KPSS test. We thus conclude that all the series are nonstationary, or integrated of order 1 in the terminology of Engle and Granger (1987) .
We also test the null hypothesis of no cointegration (against the alternative of cointegration) between the variables in each of the log-log and semi-log money demand speci…cations using the Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988) methodologies. Our results suggest that the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the money demand variables in each money demand speci…cation cannot be rejected, consistent with Serletis and Yavari (2004) . It is to be noted that Serletis and Yavari (2004) to avoid the spurious regression problem used the long-horizon regression approach, developed by Fisher and Seater (1993) , to get an estimate of the interest elasticity instead of assuming an interest elasticity of 0:5 as Lucas (2000) did with the double log money demand function in his calculations of the welfare cost of in ‡ation.
In what follows, instead of searching for a cointegrating relationship, we build a partial adjustment money demand model and work with stationary …rst-di¤erenced data to eliminate the serial correlation problem. Although the money demand elasticity can also be computed based on estimated coe¢ cients of the partial adjustment model, our main interest in using the partial adjustment model is to verify the structural breaks found in the previous section; that is, by using stationary …rst-di¤erenced time series data, we bypass the potential serial correlation problem caused by non-cointegrating I(1) time series.
Consider the log-log money demand speci…cation (2) , and in order to take account of sluggish adjustment with quarterly data, assume the partial adjustment formula ln m t ln m t 1 = (ln m t ln m t 1 )
where m t denotes actual money demand and m t re ‡ects what money demand would be if there were no adjustment costs. In equation (8), 0 1 measures the speed of adjustment. Assuming that ln m t is given by (2) , substituting (2) into (8) yields
To address the serial correlation problem, we add a trend term t to (9), where t is time itself, use the same equation for period t 1, and subtract the latter equation from the former to obtain
Equation (10) is the log-log speci…cation partial adjustment model. Following a similar procedure for the semi-log money demand speci…cation (3), we obtain the following semi-log speci…cation partial adjustment model
We estimate the partial adjustment models (10) and (11) in the context of a 2-regime Markov switching model and calculate the implied (elasticity) and (semi-elasticity) values for each regime. The estimation results are reported in Tables 7 and 8 for the log-log and semi-log speci…cations, respectively, and Figures 14-17 present the regime probabilities for each of the four estimated models with the Sum M1 and Divisia M1 money measures. In regime 1, all of the estimated coe¢ cients of the interest rate term are statistically insigni…cant with both the log-log and semi-log speci…cations and with both Sum M1 and Divisia M1, suggesting that the change in real money balance does not respond to the change in the interest rate. In regime 2, which covers the 1980s-2010s period, with the log-log speci…cation the implied money demand elasticity, 2 , is around 0:08 with Sum M1 and 0:07 with Divisia M1 (see Table 7 ). These values are close to Ireland's (2009) estimate (of about 0:086), but about two times of our estimate in the previous section (of about 0:04). Regarding the semi-log speci…cation (see Table 8 ), our estimated money demand semi-elasticity in regime 2 is 2:6 with the Sum M1 model and 2:2 with the Divisia M1 model, both of which are higher than Ireland's (2009) estimate of 1:7 and our estimates in the previous section (of 1:7 with Sum M1 and 1:6 with Divisia M1).
Although the estimated coe¢ cients of the partial adjustment model can be used to calculate the money demand elasticity, we cannot calculate the welfare cost of in ‡ation based on these estimates, because we are lacking the constant terms, ln A or ln B. The partial adjustment model mainly provides evidence of a structural change in money demand behavior in the 1980s regardless of the monetary aggregate (Sum M1 or Divisia M1) and money demand speci…cation (log-log or semi-log) used, which is consistent with our evidence in the previous section supporting a structural change in the early 1980s.
Instability Issues and Future Research
We have computed the welfare costs of in ‡ation using Markov-switching models in order to account for instabilities in the demand for real money balances, documented by a vast literature following Goldfeld's (1976) study on the 'case of the missing money.' In this regard, Goldfeld and Sichel (1990) conjectured that instability in the demand for the standard M1 monetary aggregate originates from the introduction of money market mutual funds (MMMFs) around the mid-1970s, and of money market deposits accounts (MMDAs) in 1982, both of which perform functions very similar to the demand deposits included in the standard de…nition of M1. Recently, Lucas and Nicolini (2015) and Benati et al. (2017) , in line with Teles and Zhou (2005) , argue that this is in fact the case. They show that replacing the standard M1 aggregate by an expanded version that also includes MMDAs (as in Lucas and Nicolini (2015)), MMMFs, or both, removes any evidence of instability in the very long-run demand for M1.
To investigate whether the instability in the demand for M1 originates from the fact that the standard M1 aggregate does not include either of the components originally discussed by Goldfeld and Sichel (1990) , in this section we use our Markov-switching models and the 'NewM1'aggregate of Lucas and Nicolini (2015) which augments the standard M1 aggregate with MMDAs. According to Lucas and Nicolini (2015) and Benati et al. (2017) , we should expect the Markov-switching models not to capture any evidence of instability in the demand for Sum NewM1. We construct the quarterly Sum NewM1 aggregate over our sample period, from 1967:q1 to 2013:q4, following Lucas and Nicolini (2015). The MMDAs data is provided by Lucas and Nicolini (2015) at: https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/workingpapers/on-the-stability-of-money-demand. The Sum NewM1-GDP ratio is presented in Figure 18 , together with the (standard) Sum M1-GDP ratio and the 3-month T-bill rate. As can be seen, the Sum NewM1 aggregate has a spike in 1983 when MMDAs were introduced and grows even faster than Sum M1 in the 2000s.
We apply our log-log and semi-log Markov-switching models to the Sum NewM1 monetary aggregate, and present the estimated coe¢ cients in Table 9 and the regime probabilities for each of the two speci…cations in Figures 19 and 20 . As can be seen in Table 9 , all the estimated coe¢ cients are statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. Moreover, in comparison with our results in the previous sections (using the Sum M1 and Divisia M1 aggregates), the di¤erences in the coe¢ cient estimates between the two regimes are much smaller. For example, with the log-log speci…cation, the estimated money demand elasticity is 0:1677 (with a standard error of 0:0060) in regime 1 and 0:1409 (with a standard error of 0:0060) in regime 2. Similarly, with the semi-log speci…cation, the estimated semi-elasticity of money demand is 6:2634 (with a standard error of 0:4241) in regime 1 and 6:9467 (with a standard error of 0:2647) in regime 2. In this sense, the Sum NewM1 aggregate partially restores the stability of money demand.
However, as can be seen in Figures 19 and 20 , there is clear evidence of regime switches over the sample period using the Sum NewM1 aggregate. Speci…cally, both the log-log and semi-log models detect a regime change in 1983 after the introduction of MMDAs. For the log-log speci…cation, this regime (regime 2) lasts about 30 years to 2009, but for the semi-log speci…cation it lasts about 10 years. The regime switch is still signi…cant and Figure 21 provides an illustration of the problem. We plot the Sum NewM1-GDP ratio and the Sum M1-GDP ratio against the 3-month T-bill rate and distinguish between the observations before and after 1982:q4. Clearly, by adding MMDAs to Sum M1, the money demand (Sum NewM1-GDP ratio) shifts to the right after the early 1980s, while the Sum M1-GDP ratio (without MMDAs) shifts to the left. In other words, adding MMDAs over-shifts the money demand curve rightward from its imaginary 'stable track. ' Our results show that adding MMDAs to the Sum M1 aggregate does not restore stability of money demand, using quarterly data from 1967:q1 to 2013:q4. In addition, as this paper focuses on the welfare costs of in ‡ation, components in the monetary aggregate should be non-interest bearing, since the short term interest rate is used as a measure of the opportunity cost of holding money. But using the short term interest rate as the opportunity cost of holding NewM1 is not justi…able, since MMDAs and MMMFs yield interest, so their user cost prices also are not a short term interest rate -see Barnett (1978 Barnett ( , 1980 . Especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when interest rates were very high, the user costs of MMDAs and MMMFs were much below the benchmark rate, since the MMDAs and MMMFs were themselves yielding high interest rates. For these reasons we are cautious about reporting welfare cost estimates with the Sum NewM1 monetary aggregate.
Finally, we would like to note that we used the Divisia M1 monetary aggregate in our money demand model in order to provide direct comparability with prior results. But Lucas (2000, p. 270-271) also argued that "I share the widely held opinion that M1 is too narrow an aggregate for this period [the 1990s], and I think that the Divisia approach o¤ers much the best prospect for resolving the di¢ culty."That is, what Lucas (2000) was suggesting was not just to switch from simple sum M1 to Divisia M1, but to switch to broader Divisia monetary aggregates, for which the change from simple sum to Divisia is very important. The need for the use of properly weighted broader aggregates in measuring the welfare cost of in ‡ation, has also been recognized by Cysne (2003) and Kurlat (2018) . Using the broader CFS Divisia monetary aggregates and their dual user costs as the opportunity costs (instead of the short term interest rate) to calculate the welfare costs of in ‡ation, is an area for productive future research.
Conclusions
We account for instabilities in the long-run money demand function and estimate the welfare cost of in ‡ation in the United States using the Markov regime switching approach. We circumvent problems associated with 'pre-testing'in the methodology of some of the earlier seminal contributions on these issues. We also extend the sample period and investigate the robustness of results to alternative money demand speci…cations and monetary aggregation procedures. Some of our …ndings are as follows:
A structural break in the late 1970s (with Sum M1) or early 1980s (with Divisia M1) is detected with both the log-log and semi-log money demand functions using both annual and quarterly data over di¤erent sample periods. The …tted money demand curves become steeper and shift to the left afterwards.
The estimates of the partial adjustment money demand model using stationary time series data also con…rm a structural break in the early 1980s.
The welfare cost of in ‡ation based on statistically signi…cant estimates of the money demand function declined signi…cantly (by close to 50%) after the 1980s.
The seriousness of the zero-lower-bound problem in the aftermath of the global …nancial crisis has raised the question of whether an in ‡ation target around the 2% level is too low and led to renewed interest in the welfare cost of in ‡ation, a long-standing concern of macroeconomics -see, for example, Summers et al. (2018) . In this regard, Blanchard et al. (2010) suggest that low in ‡ation limits the scope of monetary policy in recessions and that the in ‡ation target might be raised to the 4% level. Our (statistically signi…cant) estimates, based on the semi-log money demand speci…cation and the Divisia M1 monetary aggregate, suggest that a two percentage point increase in in ‡ation from the 2% target to 4% has a welfare cost of 0:0453% of income in regime 1 and 0:0233% of income in regime 2. However, the issue regarding the welfare cost of in ‡ation is not closed. For example, Bullard and Russell (2004) use a quantitative-theoretic general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy and report that "a permanent, 10-percentage-point increase in the in ‡ation rate -a standard experiment in this literature -imposes an annual welfare loss equivalent to 11.2 percent of output." More recently, Ascari et al. (2018) use an augmented dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model and report that increasing trend in ‡ation from 2% to 4% generates a consumption-equivalent welfare loss of about 4%. Also, Kurlat (2018) , in the context of a model in which bank-created money pays interest, reports that a one percentage point increase in in ‡ation has a welfare cost of 0.086% of GDP. These estimates are an order of magnitude larger than our estimates, suggesting that the welfare cost of in ‡ation question is an outstanding one in macroeconomics and monetary economics.
It is also to be noted that there is a dramatically di¤erent approach on modeling demand for money functions, using methodology for consumer demand systems modeling. This approach builds on a large body of literature, which Barnett (1997) calls the 'high-road' literature. It follows the innovative works by Diewert (1974) and Barnett (1980) and utilizes the ‡exible functional forms approach to investigating the interrelated problems of estimation of asset demand functions and instability of money demand relations in a systems context. See, for example, Barnett et al. (1992) , Barnett and Serletis (2008) , and Jadidzadeh and Serletis (2019), among others. Using this approach on modeling money demand functions, and measuring the welfare cost of in ‡ation, is another project for future research. Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. λ i , η i , and γ i are calculated based on the estimates of 1 − λ i , λ i η i , and λ i γ i in equation (10). 
